The wave of anti-Jewish pogroms that swept the Pale of Settlement after the issuance of the October Manifesto in 1905 reflected the tensions and emotions that characterized popular unrest in that revolutionary year. In the two weeks following the tsar's granting of fundamental civil rights and political liberties, pogroms, directed mainly at Jews, broke out in hundreds of cities, towns, and villages, resulting in deaths and injuries to thousands of people. 
Furthermore, wealthy Jews could not enter the leisured propertied class or translate their wealth into political influence. Only a handful of Odessa's Jews worked for the Imperial government, the judiciary or the municipal administration.10 Contrary to popular perceptions prevalent among many non-Jews both in Odessa and throughout Russia, Odessa was not controlled by its Jewish residents. Indeed, they were disenfranchised after 1892, when the central government deprived Jews of the right to elect representatives to the city council and limited Jewish representation to six appointed members of the sixty-man council. 1 The vast majority of Jews eked out meager livings as shopkeepers, second-hand dealers, salesclerks, petty traders, domestic servants, day laborers, workshop employees, and factory hands. I. Brodovskii, in his study of Jewish poverty in Odessa at the turn of the century, estimated that nearly 50,000 Jews were destitute and another 30,000 were poverty-stricken. In 1905 nearly 80,000
Jews requested financial assistance from the Jewish community in order to buy matzoh during Passover, a telling sign that well over half of the Jews in Odessa experienced difficulties making ends meet.12 Despite this disparity between popular perception and the reality of Jewish wealth and power, a reversal in Odessa's economic fortunes at the turn of the century strengthened anti-Jewish sentiments among its Russian residents. Russia entered a deep recession as the great industrial spurt of the 1890s faltered. In turn, Odessa's economy suffered a setback due to the decrease in the demand for manufactured goods, the drop in the supply of grain available for export, and the drying up of credit. Weaknesses and deficiencies in Odessa's economic infrastructure complicated matters. Conditions continued to deteriorate as the year 1905 approached, due to the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904. Trade, the mainstay of Odessa's economy, declined and the city's industrial sector entered a period of retrenchment. 13 Although anti-Jewish sentiments in Odessa usually remained submerged, many residents feared that gentile-Jewish hostilities could explode in a matter of hours. During major labor demonstrations or strikes, organizers often felt compelled to exhort workers not to direct their anger at the Jews, but to present a united front of Jew and Russian against the employer. More important, organizers had to allay fears among the general public that demonstrations and strikes might develop into pogroms.14 The fear that strikes and demonstrations would degenerate into anti-Semitic violence served to curb labor militance. For example, the 1903 May Day rally never materialized because many potential participants, Jews and non-Jews alike, feared that a march through Odessa would unleash a pogrom. 15 Employers also understood that religious animosities could be used to hinder worker solidarity. Owners of enterprises with mixed labor forces sometimes encouraged Russian workers to direct their anger at Jewish coworkers. 16 During the first half of 1905 tensions between Jews and Russians ran particularly high. Fomented in part by the sentiment that Jews were not 12 I. Brodovskii, Evreiskaia nishcheta v Odesse, Odessa, 1902, pp. 5-6; Iuzhnoe obozrenie, no. Such fears appeared once again in June in the aftermath of a general strike and the disorders occasioned by the arrival of the battleship Potemkin. On June 13 Cossacks shot several workers from metal-processing and machineconstruction factories who had been on strike since the beginning of May. Workers retaliated on June 14 by starting a general strike and attacking police with guns and rocks. The arrival of the Potemkin during the night of June 14 diverted the workers from confrontation with their employers and the government. On June 15, instead of intensifying their strike, thousands of Odessites jammed the port district in order to view the battleship and rally behind the mutinous sailors. By late afternoon, some members of the crowd began to ransack warehouses and set fire to the harbor's wooden buildings. Although the sources do not allow a precise determination of the composition of the rioters, arrest records reveal that non-Jewish vagrants, dockworkers, and other day laborers comprised the overwhelming majority.18 The military tried to suppress the unrest by cordoning off the harbor and opening fire on the trapped crowd. By the next morning nearly 2,000 people had died, victims of either the soldiers' bullets or the fire that ravaged the harbor.
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During these disorders rumors of an impending pogrom once again surfaced, as right-wing agitators attempted to incite Russian workers against the Jews.19 On June 20, only a few days after the massacre, a virulently antiSemitic, four-page broadside entitled Odesskie dni appeared. The tract blamed the Jews, in particular the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense and secondary school students, for the recent disorders and tragedy at the port. Accusing these Jews of fomenting the unrest and enlisting the support of unwitting Russians, the author of the broadside stated that Jews initiated the shootings on June 14 and 15 and were responsible for setting fire to the port.20
Jews found it difficult to dispel the accusations expressed in Odesskie dni. While many reports of Jewish revolutionary activity were exaggerations or even fabrications, Jews were behind much of the social and political ferment enveloping Odessa. During the summer the police arrested several Jews for making and stockpiling bombs. Jews also figured prominently among the 133 Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries pronounced politically unreliable, arrested or exiled after the June Days. In addition, a leaflet distributed throughout the city, apparently by a Bundist organization, urged Jews to arm themselves, struggle for civil and political freedom and overthrow the autocracy.21 Jews also organized rallies at the university and directed student strikes and public demonstrations. Like others throughout the empire, Odessa's university became the locus of anti-government activity after the tsar in August granted administrative autonomy to Russia's universities, thereby removing these institutions from the jurisdiction of the police. Jewish youths, students, and workers filled the ranks of the crowds that attended the rallies at the university in September and October, and Jews actively participated in the work stoppages, demonstrations, and street disorders that overwhelmed Odessa in mid-October. On October 16, a day of major disturbances, 197 of the 214 persons arrested were Jews.22
These events confirmed many high-ranking police and other officials in the belief that Jews were a seditious element. Government officials in Odessa had a history of blaming Jews for fomenting trouble in the city. At the turn of the century, for example, the municipal governor even asked the Ministry of Internal Affairs to limit Jewish migration to Odessa in the hope that such a measure would weaken the revolutionary movement. Odessa's officials, along with the legacy of discrimination against Russian Jewry and governmental tolerance or at times sponsorship of anti-Jewish organizations and propaganda, signaled to anti-Semites that the authorities in Odessa would probably countenance violence against Jews.24 When combined with economic resentments and frustrations as well as religious prejudices, the belief that Jews were revolutionaries helped create an explosive situation. To those residents of Odessa alarmed by the opposition to the tsar and government, Jews were a convenient target for retaliation.
Politics in Odessa polarized during 1905 as anti-and pro-government forces coalesced and mobilized. Militant right-wing organizations like the Black Hundreds and patriotic student groups consolidated their ranks; in addition to the organized revolutionary parties that had been active for years in Odessa, radical student groups also emerged as significant political forces. The stage was set for a confrontation between the forces of revolution and reaction. The pogrom occurred in the context of this unrest and the feverish atmosphere in Odessa and throughout Russia. During the week before the pogrom, public calm in Odessa was disturbed by bloody confrontations pitting the populace against soldiers and police.
On October 15, a day after the police injured several high school students who were boycotting classes in sympathy for striking railway workers, radical students and revolutionaries appealed to workers to start a general strike. They collected donations for guns and ammunition, and representatives of the city's three Social Democratic organizations visited factories and workshops. Reports also circulated that students and revolutionaries were organizing armed militias. On October 16, students, youths, and workers roamed the streets of Odessa, building barricades and engaging the police and military in pitched battles. The troops summoned to suppress the demonstrations encountered fierce resistance, as demonstrators behind barricades greeted them with rocks and gunfire. Military patrols were also targets of snipers. The troops retaliated by opening fire, and by early evening the army had secured the streets of Odessa. duma and substituted the Imperial colors for the red flag that students had raised the previous day. They then headed toward the cathedral, stopping en route at the residences of Neidgart and Baron A. V. Kaul'bars, commander of the Odessa Military District. Kaul'bars, fearing confrontation between the patriotic marchers and revolutionaries, asked them to disperse. Some heeded his request, but most members of the procession continued their march. Neidgart, on the other hand, greeted the patriots enthusiastically and urged them to hold their memorial service at the cathedral. After a brief prayer service, the procession continued to march through the streets of central Odessa. 33 Suddenly, shots rang out, and a young boy carrying an icon lay dead. Most accounts of the incident assert that the shots came from surrounding buildings. No one knows for certain who was responsible for the shots, but evidence strongly suggests that they were fired by revolutionaries or members of Jewish and student self-defense brigades.34 In any case, the crowd panicked and ran through the streets as more shots were fired from rooftops, balconies, and apartment windows. Revolutionaries and self-defense units organized by students and Jews threw homemade bombs at the demonstrators, indicating that they were ready to instigate confrontations. The shootings triggered a chain reaction. Convinced that the Jews were responsible for the shootings, members of the patriotic demonstration began to shout "Beat the Kikes" and "Death to the Kikes," and went on a rampage, attacking Jews and destroying Jewish apartments, homes, and stores.
The course of events was similar in other parts of the city; members of student and Jewish self-defense brigades fired on Russians who were holding patriotic processions and provoked similar pogromist responses. However, in Peresyp, a working-class district where no patriotic procession took place, the pogrom started only after pogromists from the city center arrived and began to incite local residents. By mid-afternoon a full-fledged pogrom had developed, and it raged until October 22. 35 The list of atrocities perpetrated against the Jews is too long to recount here, but suffice it to say that pogromists brutally and indiscriminately beat, mutilated, and murdered defenseless Jewish men, women, and children. The police and military undoubtedly were the targets of civilian militias and were rightly concerned about their safety and security. Yet, as the pogrom gathered momentum, we can hardly blame the members of self-defense brigades for continuing shooting at soldiers and policemen, when many of them were actively participating in the violence. Moreover, Neidgart and Kaul'bars acted as though civilian militias were the only groups involved in the shootings, conveniently ignoring the fact that the actions of policemen and soldiers after the pogrom started were provocative and might compel Jews to defend themselves. It was not until the pogrom was in full swing that any official made an effort to stop it. Had the police and military genuinely applied their energies to halting the pogrom, the need for self-defense would have been reduced and attacks on 102, 00, op. 5, d. 3, ch. 49, 1905, 11. 66ob. and 124ob., and d. 1350, ch. 30 policeman had told him that his superiors had given their permission for three days of beating because Jews had destroyed the tsar's portrait in the municipal duma. 48 Unfortunately, no evidence indicates which police officials were responsible for these directives. Nor is there conclusive evidence linking Neidgart to the planning and approval of pogrom agitation or the pogrom itself. Considering Neidgart's efforts prior to October to avert unrest through patient negotiation and timely compromise with workers and employers, it would have been out of character for him to have approved, let alone planned, a major public disturbance. Like most government officials entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, Neidgart would have been hesitant to sanction any kind of public protest for fear of events getting out of hand.49 To be sure, he knew about the patriotic procession and even welcomed it, but this does not warrant the conclusion drawn by many Odessa residents that the municipal governor had advance knowledge of the pogrom. In fact, Neidgart so feared an eruption of violence on October 19 that he requested Kaul'bars to withdraw permission for a funeral procession planned for that day by revolutionaries and radical students to commemorate the students killed on October 16.50 Moreover, the quickness with which the authorities acted on October 18 to suppress street disorders clearly suggests that Neidgart and Kaul'bars were trying to avert a major conflagration. Who were the other participants in the pogrom and why did they join the police in viciously attacking Jews? While available sources do not allow a precise determination, they do reveal that unskilled, non-Jewish day laborers, more than any other group (including the police), filled the ranks of the pogromist mobs. These workers were especially prone to anti-Jewish violence and, as we have already seen, played a significant role not only in the patriotic procession but in other popular disorders earlier in the year as well. A closer examination of their lives will provide insight into their motives.
Day laborers in Odessa led a precarious social and economic existence, suffering from irregular, impermanent work and low wages. Many were unmarried, male migrants to Odessa who lacked marketable skills and work experience. Large numbers of these day laborers came from the countryside, where rural poverty and overpopulation were driving many young peasants to the cities in search of work. Other day workers were Jews who had moved to Odessa in order to escape the destitution of life in the shtetls and small towns of the Pale of Settlement.
Competition for employment between Jewish and gentile day workers assumed special importance at dockside and in the railway depots, where thousands of unskilled day laborers vied for employment during the peak season 54 Kuzminskii Report, pp. clxv and 124. In his report on the October disorders, Kaul'bars admitted that persons wearing military uniforms were part of the pogromist mobs, but he insisted that they had already been discharged from service. TsGVIA,f. 400, 16oe otd., op. 15, d. 2641, 1905, 1. 38. of commercial activity, which began in spring and lasted well into the fall. According to the 1897 census, slightly over 16,000 workers were unskilled day laborers without permanent jobs and specific occupations; they supplemented the city's sizable work force of dockworkers, porters, and carters during the peak season. Precise data do not exist, but most estimates of the number of dockworkers in Odessa at the turn of the century range from 4,000 to 7,000. One estimate places the number of dockworkers at 20,000. Approximately half of these workers were Jews, with another several thousand Jews employed as unskilled day laborers elsewhere in the city.55
Even during the peak periods of port activity, owners of shipping companies, brokerage firms and warehouses never required the services of all dockworkers looking for work. During the summer few dockworkers worked more than fifteen days a month; job competition acquired even larger dimensions during the off-season or periods of slump and recession, when over half of all dockworkers were unemployed. It is estimated that, between 1900 and 1903, at least 2,000 dockworkers were unemployed at any given time. . 20, d. 1, 1. 173; TsGAOR,f. 102, d. 2409, 1903, I. 74, and 4oe delopr., d. 84, ch. 12, t. 12 workers influenced the decision to establish this quota system.57 Life for day laborers who lacked permanent work was made even more difficult by the hiring process. In order to work on a given day, day laborers placed their names on sign-up sheets that subcontractors for the shipping companies and import-export firms left at different taverns throughout the city. The prospects of finding work in this manner were slim, however. Prospective laborers had to arrive between 2 and 3 A.M. in order to ensure themselves a place on the lists, and those who were fortunate to find employment for a day had to give the subcontractor approximately a third of their earnings. Day laborers were paid on a piece-rate basis, usually earning 70 or 80 kopecks per day. After a long day's work, they returned to await payment at the tavern where their subcontractor conducted business; settling up often took until 10 P.M.58 Given the extraordinary number of wasted hours, it is not surprising that many day laborers lacked the inclination to work every day. Even if they so desired, it was unlikely that they could find work because of the competition from other job seekers.
Although some day laborers lived in apartments with their families or other workers, many found their wages inadequate to rent a room or even a comer in an apartment and were forced to seek shelter in one of the crowded flophouses (HOqJIexHbie aoMa) that speckled the harbor area and poor neighborhoods of Odessa. At the turn of the century several thousand people-mostly Great Russian by nationality-slept in flophouses, with a sizable majority of them living in such accommodations for over a year and nearly half for over three years. In other words, many day laborers had become permanent denizens of night shelters. Indeed, many frequented the same flophouses day after day and even had their favorite sleeping corners.59
Conditions in the night shelters were abominable.60 Often they lacked heat and washing facilities, and their residents usually bathed in a canal filled with the warm runoff water from the municipal electric plant, since there were no public baths in the port district.61 Night shelters were breeding grounds for infectious diseases and offered the lodger only a filthy straw mattress on a cold, damp, and hard floor. Alcoholism was another contributing factor to the entry of day workers into the world of flophouses. As one twenty-year-old explained, he began sleeping in night shelters "because of vodka."62 Contemporary observers often characterized residents of flophouses as lacking the resolve to lift themselves out of these degrading surroundings. Like many other workers, they drowned their sorrows in vodka. Observers also commented that many day workers worked only in order to earn enough money to get drunk. The system of subcontracting encouraged heavy drinking since it invariably took place in taverns.63 Alcoholism not only diminished the chances of finding work, but also robbed day workers of any desire to work on a permanent basis. Consequently, many of them could not disengage themselves from the crippling world of vodka and were happy to work one or two days a week, spending the rest of the week in a drunken stupor. As one observer noted, "Hope has died in their hearts-apathy has replaced it."64 Dependent on the activity of the port for their livelihood, day laborers in general and dockworkers in particular were usually the first workers to feel the impact of downturns in the economy. During such times, lacking even the few kopecks that the night shelters charged, they often slept under the nighttime sky or in open barrels at dockside.65 Hunger was such a constant factor in the day laborers' lives that they used a broad range of phrases to express its intensity. For example, "simple hunger" (reKoxT rpocCTOi) referred to hunger caused by not eating for one day. "Deadly hunger" (reKoxT cMepTeJIbHabi) lasted somewhat longer, and "hunger with a vengeance" (reKoxT c pacnITHeM) was of "indeterminate length, whole weeks, months, in short, hunger that has no foreseeable end." 66 Many day laborers never established secure family and social roots and were never fully integrated into urban, working-class life. Even though many had lived in Odessa for years, their lives had a marginal and rootless quality.
The faces of their workmates, employers, and those who slept near them in the night shelter changed daily. The lack of fulltime employment and permanent lodgings reduced the opportunities to form friendships and establish bonds either at work or at home. Even for day laborers who enjoyed the comforts of steady work and apartments life had an ephemeral quality, since many of them were seasonal migrants who never settled in Odessa. Day laborers found it difficult under such circumstances to promote and defend their interests in an organized and sustained manner.
Observers referred to day laborers as "peaceful people," believing that "The day laborer is not terrifying when he's had his fill; when the port is busy this Odessite is calm."67 This comment implies, however, that day laborers could be less than law-abiding and peaceful during times of economic hardship. An undercurrent of tension and discontent was clearly visible among day laborers, and there were times when they released their frustrations and anger in fits of rage and fury. Such incidents occurred twice in 1905, first in June and then again in October.
In Odessa pogromist behavior had both an ethnic and a class basis that reflected the complex relationship of long-term ethnic antagonisms, the structure of Odessa's economy, and short-term political catalysts. The heritage of antiSemitism made Odessa particularly ripe for a pogrom: the legal disabilities and mistreatment endured by the Jews of Russia engendered an attitude that accepted anti-Semitism and tolerated violence against them. Moreover, the domination of the grain trade by Jewish merchants predisposed many dockworkers against the Jews, whom they conveniently saw as the source of the troubles, particularly the lack of jobs, besetting the city and themselves. Consequently, when day laborers sought an outlet for their frustrations and problems, they focused on Jews. Without taking into account the hostile, anti-Jewish atmosphere in Odessa, we cannot understand why Russian day laborers at times of economic distress chose not to attack other Russian workers who competed with them for scarce jobs or Russian employers, but instead indiscriminately lashed out at all Jews, regardless of whether they were job competitors.
Similarly, the depressed state of the Odessa economy also helped set the stage for the outbreak of the pogrom. The particularly straitened economic circumstances of 1905 produced a situation especially ripe for anti-Jewish violence. Many day laborers were out of work and, owing to their lack of skills, unlikely to find employment. Unemployment and economic competition contributed to a growing sense of frustration and despair among many pogromists and helped channel their anger against Jews. Yet economic problems alone do not explain why Russian day workers decided to attack Jews in October 1905. In June, for example, dockworkers and day laborers exploded in a fit of wanton rage, but chose to challenge the authorities by destroying the harbor. In October these same workers directed their hostility and frustration toward the Jews, although material conditions had not substantially changed.
What Two reasons can be adduced to explain the reluctance of these workers to join ranks with pogromists. First, skilled metalworkers and machinists did not face serious employment competition with Jews, who rarely worked in metalworking and machine-construction plants. Despite the fact that Jews comprised a third of Odessa's population, Jews and Russians rarely worked in the same factory or workshop, or even as members of the same work gang at dockside. In fact, Jews and Russians were generally not employed in the same branch of industry. The exception, as we have seen, was unskilled day labor. Most factory workers were Russians and Ukrainians; Jews formed a small minority. As one observer, though surely exaggerating, suggested, "Make the round of all the Odessa factories and you will perhaps find ten or fifteen Jewish metalfitters or lathe operators; some factories don't hire Jews at all."69 One estimate placed the number of Jews employed in factory production at between 4,000 and 5,000, with most working as unskilled and semiskilled operatives in cork, tobacco, match, and candy factories.70
In addition, many of the factories employing skilled workers had a history of labor activism and a tradition of political organization and awareness. As Ivan Avdeev, a Bolshevik organizer in the railway workshops, told a meeting of his coworkers, the railway workshops formed a self-defense group during the pogrom to demonstrate that "the Russian worker values civil freedom and liberty and does not become a Black Hundred or a hooligan. On the contrary, he is capable of not only protecting his own interests but those of other citizens."71 Both the railway repair shops and the Henn agricultural tool and machinery plant organized self-defense groups; both factories had a heritage of labor radicalism and a close association with Zubatovism and Social Democracy. The presence of political organizers and propagandists may have muted the antiJewish sentiment of the Russian workers in these plants and imparted an appreciation of working-class solidarity that transcended ethnic and religious divisions.
To sum up, the social composition of the work force helped determine the form and content of popular unrest. At one end of the occupational spectrum stood the unskilled day laborers who were wont to engage in campaigns of violence and destruction. At the other end were the skilled, more economically secure Russian metalworkers and machinists who tended not to participate in the pogrom and were more inclined than the unskilled to channel their protest and discontent in an organized fashion. Even though skilled and unskilled workers in Odessa frequently resorted to violence as a way to achieve their objectives, they used violence differently. The violence and public disorder that often accompanied strikes by skilled workers, as in June, could radicalize the participants and pose a revolutionary threat. But worker militance and social unrest also had reactionary consequences when Jews became the object of the workers' outrage and hostility. The pogrom served the cause of political reaction and counterrevolution by revealing how a potentially revolutionary situation could quickly be defused when the target of the workers' wrath was no longer the symbols of the autocracy. The October 1905 pogrom in Odessa illustrates how ethnic hostility was a potent force in workers' politics. Ethnic divisiveness was a centrifugal force that diminished the capacity of Odessa workers to act in a unified fashion. The pogrom defused the revolutionary movement in Odessa by dampening the workers' militance. Despite a resurgence of labor unrest in December, the fear of more bloodletting dissuaded workers from vigorously challenging their employers and the government.
